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Most developing countries strive to improve agricultural productivity by relaxing credit 
constraints, supplying better inputs, and improving marketing and distribution. However 
the efficacy of these reforms needs to be examined in the context of the behavioral 
responses of farming households. This study examines gender biases within households 
that affect short-term decisions with immediate and long-term implications. This study 
utilizes data from ICRISAT’s village level studies in India (1975-85) to highlight the 
effects of child gender on the use of agricultural inputs. The main finding is that 
households with boys tend to use purchased inputs such as fertilizers and insecticides 
more intensively compared with households with girls. In general, household with boys 
also tend to have larger land holdings, and use animal and human labor to a greater 
extent than household with girls. 
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1 Introduction  
 
This paper measures the impact of household demographics on agricultural decisions. We 
study the effects of child-gender on short-term investments in productive inputs, asking 
whether the behavior of households with a male child differ from those without. We test a 
simple hypothesis using a straightforward approach. We ask whether having a male child 
increases the marginal investment in land compared with having only a female child. 
Increasing agricultural productivity remains a priority for most developing 
economies. Although the Green Revolution minimized food shortages to a large extent, 
malnutrition and hunger persist. In rural and agrarian economies, improvements in health 
and nutritional outcomes are brought about by direct investments in nutrition, health 
and/or through improvements in agricultural production and practices. As a result, 
governments and donors continue to engage in efforts to boost agricultural productivity 
by relaxing credit constraints, supplying more and better inputs, improving distribution 
and marketing networks, and minimizing discrimination against female farmers. 
However, the effectiveness of these reforms must be examined in the larger context of the 
targeted population and potential behavioral responses to incentives.  
As an example, consider households with a given level of income which it 
allocates to consumption and savings/investment. The proportion of income spent by 
households on food, nutrition and health (investments in human capital) or on agricultural 
improvements is, in turn a function of various factors. Some of these include prices, 
education, farm size, wealth, credit constraints, labor and access to complementary inputs 
and demographics such as age and sex of household members. 
  2
Demographic features of the household, such as age and gender composition of 
the farm family act as important conditioning factors for household behavior.  The 
gender-mix of children in the household is—assuming gender-selective abortion is not 
practiced—an exogenous variable. But in many developing countries there seems to be a 
marked “son preference,” which is understood to arise out of socio-economic pressures 
(see the discussion below). Numerous studies document this preference for males and it is 
possible that this preference introduces different behavioral attitudes, especially toward 
land and agriculture. Thus, efforts to intensify agricultural production and improve food 
and nutrition can be enhanced or minimized by the prevailing norms and beliefs that 
condition household behavior.  
In this context, this study will attempt to highlight differences, if any, in the way 
rural households behave towards cultivation and field operations when they have sons or 
daughters.  We can expect that households with more males would tend to invest more in 
agriculture for various reasons. These could range from having more manpower and labor 
to facilitate work to such considerations as inter-generational transfers of land and 
accumulated wealth. In response, the intensity of cropping and agricultural productivity 
could well be determined not only by technology and credit constraints but also by 
perceptions regarding the relative economic value of girls and boys.  
 
2 A brief review of the literature on gender bias 
Discussions on gender tend to focus on discrimination against women and children. 
There is vast sociological/psychological literature on prejudices based on the gender of 
children within a household. Several studies indicate that the behavior of parents towards  3
marriage, fertility and even resources can vary depending on the gender of the child 
(Lundberg, 2005; Clark, 2000).  
Although examples of gender based discrimination abound in sociological 
literature, there is evidence of gender-based discrimination in economic literature as well. 
Economists have tended to focus on the allocation of resources within the households.  
Intra-household allocations have also been explored in detail (Kanbur and Haddad, 1994;  
Behrman and Deolalikar, 1990; Deaton 1989, 1995; Deaton et al., 1989; Quisimbing et 
al., 1995; Pitt, Rosenzweig and Hassan, 1990). 
Other examples of gender-based discrimination include women’s access to credit 
markets (Morris and Meyer, 1993), effects of men and women’s incomes on health, 
nutrition and education of children (Strauss and Thomas, 1995), women and natural 
resource management (Agarwal, 1997), differential household behavior depending on the 
gender of the household head (Doss and Morris, 2001). The impact of having a son or a 
daughter on household income and wages, savings and/or time allocation by parents has 
been studied in many traditional and non-traditional societies (Deolalikar, and Rose, 
1998; Lundberg, 2002). 
Recent studies in development have questioned the assumption that the household 
is the basic unit of analysis wherein all incomes are pooled and resources allocated 
equally across members (Alderman et al. 1995; Udry 1995). Given the “son preference” 
in South and South East Asia, several studies examined the issue of households 
functioning as a single unit wherein all incomes are pooled and all resources are allocated 
equally. At the simplest level, high mortality rates among women in most developing 
countries are symptomatic of a gender based discrimination that is not visible.  4
Behrman and Deolalikar (1990) using ICRISAT data from a sample of villages in 
rural India find that women are more prone to food shortages and malnutrition. Intra-
household variances range from 15% to 48% for various nutrients indicating that nutrient 
intakes may not be the same among household members. Food price elasticities are 
generally negative for women and girls suggesting asymmetric treatment of women, 
especially in periods of food shortage and insecurity. They conclude that the burden of a 
food shortage falls disproportionately on women and girls, and that—in their sample—
the deprivation experienced by females during food shortages amounts to gender 
discrimination.  In contrast, using consumption expenditure data from the National 
Sample Survey of India, Deaton (1989) does not find any evidence of discrimination in 
the allocation of goods within a household.   
Kebede (2003) uses data from Ethiopia to test if there is evidence of 
discrimination against females. Following Deaton’s outlay equivalent approach he uses 
the quadratic AIDS model and also address the issues related to exogeneity of income, 
prices, and panel data to control for fixed effects and censoring since many commodities 
are not used explicitly during survey periods. The results show that females have higher 
income and price elasticities as compared to men implying that the effect of income and 
price shocks are most likely to be absorbed by females.  
The main idea in the above mentioned studies is to quantify the reduction in 
expenditure on adult goods when there are male or female children. Some of these papers 
find little evidence of discrimination against girls which can be attributed to the sampling 
methodology (Udry, 1995).   5
  The persistence of widespread malnutrition and hunger especially among small 
householders has focused increasing attention on issues regarding dissemination and 
adoption of agricultural technologies by farmers. An important aspect of this is gender-
based differential rates of technology adoption. Using data from Ghana, Doss and Morris 
(2001) examine whether the inclusion of gender, specifically the gender of the household 
head can explain technology adoption decisions. The authors focus on two different 
technologies: modern varieties of maize and chemical fertilizers. Using a two-stage probit 
model, the authors conclude that gender per se does not have any effect on the rates of 
technology adoption. However if the technology requires complementary inputs such as 
access to land, labor, extension services etc, impacts of the adopted technology will not 
be gender neutral, especially if female farmers have limited access to complementary 
resources. 
By and large, the inclusion of demographics as explanatory variables has been 
limited to using the gender of the household head and educational attainments. The 
impact of family composition has not been explored in detail in mainstream economics.  
A few studies that focus on the wages and time allocation by parents indicate that having 
male children in the family, serves to increase productivity of fathers. The increase in the 
hours worked by men was much more if they had a son as compared to the increase on 
account of a daughter (Lundberg and Rose, 2002). 
For the Philippines, Estudilloa et al. (2001) found a marked difference in lifetime 
incomes arising from parental preferences in the allocation of land inheritance and 
investments in schooling between sons and daughters. Sons were found to be preferred 
with respect to land inheritance, receiving 0.15 additional hectares of land, while  6
daughters were treated more favourably in schooling investments, receiving 1.5 more 
years of schooling. This suggests that Filipino parents allocate intergenerational transfers 
to equalize incomes among their children, without sacrificing efficiency. These 
differences are not mirrored in developed or wealthy societies, however. For example, 
Taubman (1991) reports that both sons and daughters have comparable levels of 
education, nutrition and tend to be treated equally with regard to inheritances etc. 
Nevertheless, the gender of the child can have an impact on the parental behavior, 
fertility rates, earnings and wealth of a household. Evidence from India suggests that with 
the exception of the South Indian state of Kerala, the entire country has a sex ratio which 
is unfavorable for women. On account of economic, social or religious reasons, there is a 
strong desire to have sons especially among rural Hindu and Muslim women (Clark, 
2000). Economic factors alone do not account for the pervasive son-preference in the 
community: sons have a deeper cultural significance which persists even when widows 
are financially well-off or independent (Vlassoff, 1990).  
Various factors can be responsible for the influence of gender on family behavior. 
For instance, social and cultural norms could emphasize the role of males as a household 
head and means of familial support especially in old age. Also women could be 
associated with an increased economic burden especially on account of marriage and 
dowry (Jaggi, 2001, Anderson, 1999). Inheritance laws favoring inter-generational 
transfers of land and property among men can also be responsible for strengthening the 
desire to have sons. Despite the fact that women often work on farms and constitute an 
important element in household production, the economic value of a woman’s labor is 
lost to the family after marriage.  A desire to retain immovable assets within the family  7
also can give rise to preferential treatment of sons under the assumption that they will not 
split the family after marriage. Economic treatment of this “son preference” can be found 
in the work on bequest behavior and marriages. Using a Game-theoretic approach, Zhang 
(2001) shows that a Nash equilibrium exists when bequests are non negative and all 
bequests are left to the male child. 
All of these findings point to the plausibility that the gender of the child will act 
as an important exogenous variable influencing several household decisions. Child 
gender can independently affect investments in land by way of cultivation practices such 
as fertilization, manuring, drainage, etc. or improvements in technology or even 
conservation of land.  From a policy making perspective, it is necessary to account for 
differential treatment of individual household members that results in inequities within 
households. Failure to do so can give rise to problems of asymmetric information and 
moral hazard that may actually undermine the effectiveness of policies based on the 
household as a unit of analysis (Fuwa et al., 2006).  For instance, in most LDCs, meals 
are provided to school children to improve their nourishment. However these may be 
viewed by recipients as a substitute for meals at home resulting in their being given less 
food at home (Fuwa et al., 2006).  Similarly, institutional norms and customs prevailing 
in society can result in differential access to economic resources. This can possibly 
become an underlying cause of conflict and discrimination with in the household.  
To measure potential gender-based differentials in agricultural investments, below 
we focus on agricultural land and the use of agricultural inputs. From a bequest point of 
view, even a weak preference for sons would imply that the major share of the wealth 
including land will be left to sons.  In that case, the incentives to work on land and  8
intensify production or adopt conservation practices may be conditioned by the gender-
mix of children within a household. It is our contention that in rural and agrarian 
societies, adoption of technology or conservation practices or simply cultivation are a 
function of not just insurance, credit, inputs but also the gender of the children, income 
and educational attainment of the household members. 
 
3 Study site and data 
This study examines farm households from a group of villages in rural India.  The farms 
are located in the semi-arid tropical belt. Several government sponsored schemes such the 
Employment Guarantee Scheme and the Public Distribution System providing subsidized 
foods are in operation here. With regard to “son preference” the region does not rank very 
high compared with northern India. Some evidence of discrimination against women and 
children is provided by Behrman and Deolalikar (1990) and Clark (2000). 
In general, the legal system in India is geared towards ensuring fair treatment of 
women. Inheritance laws have become more egalitarian allowing Hindu women to have 
an equal share in their family’s wealth and assets including agricultural land. The practice 
of dowry at the time of marriage and sex determination of the fetus is abolished by law. 
Yet, anecdotal evidence suggests that these malpractices are still rampant, especially in 
rural areas.   
Data for this analysis come from the ICRISAT VLS (International Crops 
Research Institute in Semi-Arid Tropics, Village Level Studies) for Rural India. The VLS 
are panel data collected at regular intervals in six villages from 1975-85. The survey 
covered 240 households. It was discontinued in 1985 but restarted in 2000. The major  9
objective of the VLS was to understand the socioeconomic, agro-biological, institutional 
constraints to agricultural development in semi-arid tropical areas.  We use data from 
schedules C and Y of the survey. 
  For analysis, since this study looks at family composition, an indicator variable 
was created that takes the value of 1 if there was at least 1 boy in the household and 0 if 
there was none. Similar variables were constructed for households with only girls. These 
data were merged to obtain a complete dataset consisting of demographics and farming 
data.  The final data set used for this analysis includes 249 households in 8 villages over a 
period of 10 years. Childless households were excluded from the dataset. 
A key assumption in this analysis is that the sex of the child is determined 
exogenously. The basis for this assumption is that sex selection techniques would not 
have been available in rural Indian villages during 1975-84. At present, sex determination 
is illegal in India. 
 
4 Basic patterns in the ICRISAT data 
The main hypothesis of this study is that the gender of the children within a  household 
has an effect on farm-level decision making. At the outset we examine the age and gender 
structure of the population for two selected years (1975 and 1984). 
  Table 1 shows the percentage of households in different land classes for 
households with boys and girls.
1 The definition of farm size varied from village to 
village; therefore these estimates are based on the variable “land class” given in the 
                                                 
1 A household consists of those living together and consuming food from a common 
kitchen. Land class is defined in the VLS based on operational holding. These take on 
values 0, 1, 2 and 3, ranging from labor, small, medium and large respectively (Manual of 
instructions, ICRISAT).  10
survey data.  The table shows the distribution of households according to village and the 
gender of the children for 1984. Overall, 75 per cent of households had at least one 
female child in the age group 0-15 years; 77% had at least one boy in the age group 0-15 
years; 24% had only boys and 23% had only female children. The average household size 
was 7.6 members. 
In 1984, Village F had the highest number of households with girls (100%) 
followed by village D (90.91%) and village E (80.95%).  In contrast, 100% of the 
households in village F had at least 1 boy and 95.24% in village E had a boy.  29% of the 
households in village H and 33% in village A had only female children. The percentage 
of households having only male children was highest in village B (31.25%) and villages 
G and C (30%) In general the number of boys in the population is much greater than the 
number of female children. Since we assume that the gender of the child is exogenous 
and that sex selective abortion is not practiced, this could imply that people have more 
children in an attempt to have a boy.  Interestingly, with the exception of villages B and 
H, household size tended to be smaller in villages with a relatively larger number of 
households with boys. It ranged from 6.4 in village B to 9.8 in village F.  The 
predominance of men in the population and the slightly smaller household size suggests 
that the birth of a boy results in smaller families. Households with girls are more likely to 
have children till they have a boy. 
Table 2 presents some results on the land class, field activities and the use of 
animal and human labor. We find that 8.3% of the households with only girls are 
agricultural labor households whereas 50% are large landholders. On the other hand, 
none of households with only boys fall into the agricultural labor class whereas 36% are  11
large farmers. Households with at least one boy are mainly distributed across small 
(26%), medium (30%) and large landholding classes (36%). The average cultivated area 
for households with girls is 9.2 acres, less than a quarter of which is irrigated. The 
average cultivated area for households with at least one boy is 8.7 acres, with 
approximately a third irrigated. Households with only boys have on average 7.6 acres of 
cultivated land, 38% of it irrigated. Perhaps the presence of a boy induces deliberate 
acquisition of land either through purchase or leasing in. 
  The lower panels of Table 2 also show cultivation activities carried out by 
households according to the gender of children. While general field preparation, sowing 
and harvest are performed by all households, fewer households with only girls (66%) 
engage in fertilization of land, manuring, (54%), plant protection (17%), weeding (33%) 
and harvesting of by- products (63%). In contrast 88% of households with only boys use 
fertilizers, 64% use manures, 64% carry out activities such as weeding, harvesting of by 
products (68%),  irrigation (76%). Activities appear to be defined to some extent by 
gender. There are distinct activities such as interculturing, resowing, nursery cultivation 
that are performed to a greater extent by households with girls only.  
  Agricultural inputs used were divided into 4 groups: fertilizers, insecticides, 
manures and pesticides. With the exception of insecticides, the average level of use of all 
other inputs was higher in households with boys. The use of fertilizers by households 
with only boys averaged 242 kg compared with 145 kg by households with only girls. 
The use of manure also was comparatively higher for households with only boys (73 kg) 
compared with households with only girls (48 kg).  12
  Examining the use of human and animal labor by households with different 
demographics, we find that on average the animal and human labor use hours were higher 
for households with boys/only boys. Animal labor hours averaged 253 hours for 
households with only girls and 255 hours for households with only boys. The use of 
family males was 463 hours for girl households and 763 hours for households with boys. 
The use of hired labor, both men and women was again higher for households with boys. 
The interesting exception to this trend is the labor hours expended by a family child. Girl 
households on average expended 23 hours whereas the use of a family child was 
restricted to 10 hours for households with at least one boy and 8 hours for households 
with only boys. This may point towards somewhat asymmetric treatment of girls and 
boys. While the agricultural operations conducted by boy households appear to be more 
intensive, there is also a tendency to use the labor of boys sparingly. Perhaps they engage 
in education and other activities. 
  Agriculture involves manual labor to a great extent. The role played by women in 
agriculture cannot be over-emphasized. Women’s activities are often the most important 
in producing a finished product. A cursory examination of our evidence suggests some 
farming decisions may be influenced by family composition. In particular, the presence 
of male children seems to lead to more hours being worked on the farm and more 
intensive use of some inputs.  
 
5 Regression results 
To investigate the patterns described above in a multivariate context we turn to regression 
analysis. The dataset contains 657 observations over the 10-year period, and 249 unique  13
household observations. For purposes of this paper we use ordinary least squares for the 
regressions, putting observed input levels on the left-hand side of a series of regressions 
and gender composition variables on the right-hand side. These choice variables are 
contemporaneously correlated, suggesting a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
approach, but since we use an identical set of explanatory variables in our regressions, the 
GLS estimator of SUR is the same as the OLS estimator obtained using single equation 
methods.  For the time being, we do not take explicit account of the longitudinal nature of 
the data, but do correct for heteroskedasticity using White's standard errors.  We use 
reduced form equations of the form: 
 
input intensity = f (child gender, education, area, land values, location) 
 
where the dependent variable is the intensity of input use, computed as the quantity of 
input used on a plot divided by the total plot area. The inputs of interest are fertilizers, 
manures, insecticides and pesticides. 
  To begin we use two specifications to examine the effect of a boy and other 
variables on the use of inputs. In the first series, reported in Table 3, input intensity is 
regressed on indicator variables that equal one for (i) households with only girls, (ii) 
households with only boys and (iii) households with at least one boy and at least one girl. 
Irrigated area and land value are also included as regressors.
2 In the second set of models, 
reported in Table 4, input use intensities are regressed on “boy,” the highest education 
                                                 
2 Land values per acre (in 100 Rupees) are based on information obtained from either 
patwari or some knowledgeable person in the village.  The values reflect the potential 
sale value of the plot considering location, irrigation, topography, etc.  14
level attained by any member of the household, the irrigated area and a set of binary 
village indicators.  
Table 3 indicates that relative to a household with only girls, the total average 
fertilizer intensity on a plot is 22.2 kg/acre higher in the presence of a boy and 25 kg/acre 
for households with only boys and no female children. For boy-only households the use 
of manures is 24 kg/acre higher than for girl-only households. On average, boy presence 
has a positive and significant (but negligible) effect on the use of insecticides.  
  As expected, the sign of the coefficient on irrigated area is positive for fertilizer, 
manure and insecticides, and in the case of fertilizer results indicate that an increase in 
the level of education would result in higher use of purchased inputs. The coefficient on 
land value is negative and significant for manure and pesticide use. Perhaps an increase 
in the potential sale value of the land decreases the incentive to cultivate it intensively. 
Results from Table 4 indicate similar patterns. The indicator for “only boy” is 
positive and significant for manure use, which is 33 kg/acre higher for this group 
compared with the base value of 24 kg/acre for households with only girls. The 
correlation between presence of a boy and use of insecticides and pesticides is positive 
and weakly significant. The presence of a boy is positively and significantly correlated 
with fertilizer use, however, the magnitude of the correlation is smaller than for a 
household with only girls. The level of education attained, as indicated by “diploma” by a 
household member, is not significantly correlated with input use in this model. Land 
values are negatively correlated with use of fertilizers and manures at statistically 
significant levels. As expected, total irrigated area has a positive and significant 
correlation with the use of fertilizers.  15
To look at the data from a different perspective, Table 5 presents the first of two 
regressions for different land classes. Land class refers to the ownership of land and takes 
one of four values: landless, small, medium or large. Here we combine the sample of 
medium and large farms and run separate regressions for each of the groups of 
landowners.  Results in Table 5 indicate that, for small landowners, the presence of a boy 
has a positive and significant correlation with the use of insecticides and a negative and 
significant correlation with use of fertilizers. Although the use of insecticides and 
fertilizers appears to be higher for households with girls, the correlations are not 
statistically significant. Interestingly, higher educational levels are negatively correlated 
with the use of fertilizers, manure and insecticides and these effects are statistically 
significant. It is possible that this may reflect diversification into other occupations in 
households with better opportunities. The combination of small farms and high 
educational attainment likely leads households to move into other occupations, thereby 
reducing incentives to invest in agriculture and cultivation. Land values again have a 
negative and significant correlation with the use of fertilizers and manures. 
   Turning to households in the medium and large landowning classes (Table 6) 
regression results reveal higher cultivation intensity in the presence of boys. Relative to 
households with only girls, the use of fertilizers is higher by 38 kg/acre and the use of 
manure is higher by 14 kg/acre in households with only boys. Again, the presence of 
male children has a negative and significant correlation with pesticide use. Irrigated area 
has a positive and significant correlation with the use of fertilizers and manures as 
expected. Land values are negatively correlated with use of fertilizers and manures at 
statistically significant levels.  Once again the effect of education is positive although  16
statistically insignificant.  Results confirm that the presence of a boy is correlated with 
higher intensity of fertilizer and manure use; this correlation is statistically significant.  
The patterns exhibited in these models with respect to the correlation between the 
presence of boys and the intensity of input use is even more pronounced when we 
examine households with different land owning status. This is done in tables 7, 8 and 9. 
We find, not unexpectedly, that households which own significant amounts of land are 
likely to invest more in agriculture compared with those that operate small land holdings. 
Tables 7-9 present results of regressions for different categories of land value. For farms 
with very low land values (up to Rs. 5000/acre), the only significant gender variable is 
presence of a male child, which is positively and significantly correlated with the 
intensity of fertilizer and manure use. As land values increase we find that the increase in 
the use of fertilizer and manure intensity is large and statistically significant relative to an 
only girls households. Irrigated area has a significant and positive effect on fertilizers and 
manures intensities as expected. Land value and higher education still exert a negative 
influence on the use of inputs. At very high land values (Rs. 21,201-292,100/acre, Table 
9) adding a boy to an only girls household increases the use of fertilizers from 10 kg/acre 
to 16 kg/acre and increases manure use from 4 kg/acre to 10 kg/acre. Irrigated area has a 
positive effect on the use of fertilizers and manures while land values have a positive and 
significant effect on the use of insecticides and pesticides. 
The general picture that emerges from the results reported above is that having a 
boy in the household has a positive and significant correlation with the intensity of input 
use, especially fertilizers and manure. Land values have a negative correlation with input 
use intensity. A unit increase in irrigated area increases the use of fertilizers and manures  17
but has no significant impact on insecticides and pesticides as expected. Finally, the 
effects of higher education are ambiguous. This perhaps points to opportunities for 
diversification into other occupations as family members attain more education.  
 
6 Conclusions  
The objective of this study was modest: to examine whether a gender bias might exist 
that influences household decision-making with regard to farming. A brief description of 
the data clearly indicates the potential for a bias in favor of males in the population. 
Certain activities such as fertilization of the soil, weeding and manuring are carried out to 
a larger extent by household with boys. This could point toward an inherent bias in 
agriculture which is “man” power intensive. The use of inputs and human and animal 
labor is also higher for household with boys. Regressions confirm that household 
demographics are correlated with input use. The presence of a boy was found to be 
positively correlated with the intensity of fertilizer and insecticide use in most of the 
regression formulations explored here.  
  Although we leave it for future efforts to explore these patterns in greater 
econometric detail, drawing on the panel nature of the data, in the light of these findings 
we feel confident in concluding that gender composition inside agricultural households 
appears to be influencing household behavior regarding use of productive inputs. Our 
results thereby extend and expand the existing literature from a focus on intra-household 
allocation to farm level decision making. We believe this opens a wide avenue of 
opportunity for research and believe it would be instructive to examine the bias we 
uncover using data from more recent surveys and other sites and circumstances.   18
Policy prescriptions to issues raised here could include increasing education and 
awareness about gender roles and economic values, and inheritance laws associated with 
men and women. The results could also imply development of alternative technologies or 
occupations to cater specifically to the demand of women, such as micro-credit schemes. 
Development of women-oriented schemes would not only help female headed households 
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   Villages   
% with 
All 
villages  A B C D E F G H 
N 
obs 
At least  
1  girl  76  76 69 70 91 81  100  70 76 79 
At least  
1  boy  77  67 88 70 86 95  100  75 76 80 
No  
boy  23  33 13 30 14  5  0  25 29 24 
Only  
boys  24  24 31 30  9  19  0  30 24 25 
Boy  
and  girl  53  43 56 40 77 76  100  45 47 55 
Household 
size  7.6  6.5 6.4 7.1 7.0 8.4 9.8 7.9 7.9   
N  obs  104  21 32 20 22 21  5  20 17   
Note: observations are for 1984, except for villages B and D, which are for 1975.  22
Table 2 Cultivation and activity, by child gender (1984) 













Land Class (%) 
Landless 10.1  7.5  8.3  0.0  10.9 
Small 21.5  26.3  16.7  32.0  23.6 
Medium 27.9  30.0  25.0  32.0  29.1 
Large 40.5  36.3  50.0  36.0  36.4 
Cultivated area  9.3  8.7  9.1  7.6  9.3 
Irrigated area (acres)  2.3  2.8  1.3  2.9  2.7 
Field operations (%) 
Fertilizer 77.2  83.8  66.7  88.0  81.8 
Manuring 51.9  55.0  54.2  64.0  50.9 
Plant protection  25.3  26.3  16.7  20.0  29.1 
Weeding 54.4  63.8  33.3  64.0  63.6 
Harvesting 96.2  96.3  100.0  100.0  94.5 
Interculturing 77.2  75.0  87.5  80.0  72.7 
Resowing 13.9  10.0  12.5  0.0  14.5 
Irrigation 68.4  73.8  58.3  76.0  72.7 
Orchard 0.0  1.3  0.0  4.0  0.0 
Nursery 10.1  13.8  28.2  20.0  10.9 
Input use (kg/acre) 
Fertilizer 312.7  340.8  145.2  241.6  385.9 
Manure 40.4  48.3  48.1  72.8  37.1 
Insecticide 0.6  0.7  0.1  0.6  0.8 
Pesticides 0.01  0.26  0.00  0.80  0.02 
Average labor use (hours/year) 
Own animal  323.6  323.0  253.8  254.6  354.1 
Family male  554.5  647.1  463.5  763.6  594.2 
Family female  222.0  287.6  157.2  369.6  250.3 
Family child  15.2  10.3  23.3  7.3  11.7 
Hired male  375.6  417.8  299.3  437.3  408.9 
Hired female  884.0  931.8  525.5  692.8  1040.4  23
Table 3 Input use intensity regressions 
 
Variable Fertilizer  Manure    Insecticide  Pesticide   
No boy  20.76 10.47  0.04  -0.35 
  (10.75)** (3.72)*  (0.03)  (0.13)* 
Boy & girl  22.18 9.36  0.06  -0.37 
  (7.48)* (2.90)*  (0.03)* (0.19)** 
Only boy  24.98 23.52  0.21  -0.673 
  (9.31)* (12.78)  (0.09)*  (0.31)* 
Irrigated area  3.00 0.15  0.02  -0.04 
  (0.59)* (0.36)  (0.01)  (0.03) 
Land value  -0.03 -0.01 -0.000 0.004 
  (0.01) (0.01)*  (0.00)  (0.00)* 
F  42.70 19.25  7.39  44.94 
N  657 657  657  657 
 
In this and all following tables standard errors appear in parentheses.  
* indicates significantly different from zero at 95% confidence level 
** indicates significantly different from zero at 90% confidence level 
  24
Table 4 Input use intensity regressions, with village dummies 
 
Variable Fertilizer    Manure  Insecticide  Pesticide 
No boy  63.030 24.477  0.094  1.254 
  (6.77)* (2.74)*  (0.05)  (0.48)* 
Boy & girl  56.404 21.883  0.154  1.229 
  (3.57)* (3.85)*  (0.10)  (0.60)* 
Only boy  61.473 32.936  0.205  0.863 
  (4.60)* (4.79)*  (0.18)  (0.75) 
Irrigated area  2.350 -0.172 0.002  -0.019 
  (0.57)* (0.54)  (0.01)  (0.04) 
Diploma   3.348 2.271 -0.003 -0.211 
  (6.66) (3.06) (0.04)  (0.30) 
Land value  -0.041 -0.016 0.000  0.004 
  (0.02)* (0.00)*  (0.00)  (0.00)* 
Household size  0.635 0.381 -0.014 -0.035 
  (0.95) (0.33) (0.01)  (0.03) 
Village A  -54.517 -13.731  0.154  -1.431 
  (4.63)* (1.15)* (0.03)*  (0.50)* 
Village B  -4.616 0.296 0.026  -1.403 
  (4.98) (1.47) (0.05) (0.39)* 
Village C  -55.250 -21.934  -0.077  -1.925 
  (2.81)* (0.83)* (0.02)*  (0.37)* 
Village D  -59.038 -20.905  -0.027  -1.758 
  (3.18)* (1.52)*  (0.02)  (0.35)* 
Village E  -37.641 -22.244  0.154  -1.504 
  (4.72)* (0.99)* (0.03)*  (0.51)* 
Village F  -48.359 -22.591  -0.031  -1.052 
  (5.49)* (1.44)*  (0.03)  (0.69) 
Village G  -19.442 -11.922  -0.074  -1.232 
  (4.06)* (1.36)*  (0.04)  (0.48)* 
N  545 545 545  545 
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Table 5 Input use regressions, small land owners only 
 
Variable Fertilizer  Manure  Insecticide  Pesticide 
No boy  33.249 14.812  0.095  -0.213 
  (18.20) (7.61)**  (0.04)*  0.20 
Boy & girl  22.536 13.423  0.078  -0.122 
  (10.40)* (4.85)*  (0.04)  (0.12) 
Only boy  20.224 29.105  0.405  -0.126 
  (9.51)* (15.28)**  (0.36)  (0.17) 
Irrigated area  6.666 0.488 -0.028 0.038 
  (4.19)  (1.57) (0.03) (0.08) 
Land value  -0.070 -0.043  -0.000  0.002 
  (0.04)* (0.02)*  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Diploma  -20.962 -11.838  -0.060  0.033 
  (9.55)* (4.23)*  (0.03)*  (0.04) 
N  193  193 193 193 
 
 
Table 6 Input use regressions, large and medium land owners 
 
Variable Fertilizer    Manure    Insecticide   Pesticide  
No boy  22.16 8.77  0.05  -0.438 
  (11.42)** (2.99)*  (0.03)  (0.15)* 
Boy & girl  24.15 6.57  0.10  -0.55 
  (7.59)* (1.95)*  (0.06)  (0.21)* 
Only boy  38.52 14.42  0.03  -1.18 
  (11.79)* (5.80)*  (0.05)  (0.44)* 
Irrigated area  2.61 0.37  0.01  -0.03 
  (0.62)* (0.14)*  (0.00)  (0.04) 
Land value  -0.03 -0.01  0.000  0.01 
  (0.01)* (0.00)*  (0.00)  (0.00)* 
Diploma   9.62 4.44  -0.07  -0.02 
  (10.81)* (6.19)  (0.04)  (0.24) 
F  50.233 11.132  30.331  37.198 
N  352 352  352  352 
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Table 7 Input use regressions, land values up to Rs. 5000 per acre 
 
Variable  Fertilizer   Manure   Insecticide   Pesticide  
No boy  9.464 -0.092  0.044  0.000 
  (11.86) (6.18)  (0.12)  (0.00) 
Boy & girl  8.695 -1.395  0.011  0.000 
  (11.25) (6.79)  (0.08)  (0.00) 
Only boy  11.471 20.534  0.447  0.000 
  (6.21) (8.26)*  (0.39)  (0.00) 
Irrigated area  14.455 -0.561  -0.037  0.000 
  (2.83)* (2.79)  (0.04)  (0.00) 
Land value  0.200 0.396  0.002  0.000 
  (0.37) (0.29)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Diploma   24.548 22.681  -0.000  0.000 
  (24.36) (26.35)  (0.07)  0.00 
F  8.099 4.128 80.855  . 
N  176 176  176  176 
 
Table 8 Input use regressions, land values from Rs. 5001 to Rs. 21,200 per acre 
 
Variable  Fertilizer   Manure   Insecticide   Pesticide  
No boy  62.78 18.05  0.03  -0.13 
  (29.92)* (6.67)*  (0.04)  (0.12) 
Boy & girl  51.15 13.54  0.09  -0.07 
  (23.87)* (5.39)*  (0.10)  (0.07) 
Only boy  74.34 21.46  0.03  -0.12 
  (31.16)* (9.88)*  (0.05)  (0.11) 
Irrigated area  5.72 1.27  0.04  0.02 
  (2.98)** (0.44)*  (0.04)  (0.03) 
Land value  -0.28 -0.06  -0.00  0.001 
  (0.16) (0.04)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Diploma   -14.29 -8.06  -0.22  -0.15 
  (22.04) (3.16)*  (0.19)  (0.15) 
F  6.960 11.289  6.115  17.099 
N  185 185  185  185 
 
  27





Variable  Fertilizer   Manure   Insecticide   Pesticide  
No boy  10.71 4.80  0.05  -1.34 
  (10.56) (3.71)  (0.06)  (0.37)* 
Boy & girl  16.02 3.69  0.08  -1.54 
  (8.97) (2.15)  (0.11)  (0.36)* 
Only boy  16.44 10.62  0.04  -2.23 
  (8.74) (8.00)  (0.09)  (0.63)* 
Irrigated area  2.38 0.36 0.001 -0.020 
  (0.42)* (0.10)*  (0.00)  (0.05) 
Land value  -0.01 -0.003  0.000  0.006 
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)* (0.00)* 
Diploma   0.62 -0.25  -0.04  -0.22 
  (7.78) (1.68)  (0.04)  (0.37) 
F  19969.62 207.41  150.21  187.84 
N  184 184  184  184 